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RESTOCKING THE BRITISH WORLD: EMPIRE MIGRATION 
AND ANGLO-CANADIAN RELATIONS, 1919-30* 
 
Canada is a land flowing with milk and honey for all men and women 
able and willing to work.  People from these [British Isles] are sure of a 
warm reception and a happy home.  Sir Wilfrid Laurier’s prophesy that 
the twentieth century belongs to Canada will be fulfilled. 
 
Peter Larkin, Canadian High Commissioner in London1 
 
Throughout the 1920s Canadian politicians, immigration officials, eugenicists, 
educationalists, and political commentators talked about the need to ‘Canadianize’ all 
immigrants who arrived in the dominion, including those from the ‘mother country’.  
However, this did not mean that Ottawa was out to ‘de-Britannicize’ those arriving 
from the United Kingdom.  British migrants, a crucial component that underpinned 
Canada’s cultural identity at this time, were given preferred status because their 
common heritage and shared cultural values mirrored those of most Anglo-Canadians. 
 Indeed, ‘Britishness’ made up the bedrock of Anglo-Canadian ‘national’ identity.  
Therefore, at one level British migrants were seen as less problematic and easier to 
acculturate to the Canadian way of life because for many Canadians being British and 
Canadian were one and the same.  As Alan Sears has argued, the crux of the problem 
in ‘forging a “national people” [hinged on] defining some people as more naturally 
Canadian (or capable of becoming Canadian) than others’.2  However, the 
development of a ‘national people’ was not an attempt by Canada to break the bonds 
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of empire.  Carl Berger reminded us long ago far from being incompatible the 
development of Canadian nationalism was premised upon it being nurtured within an 
imperial framework.3  Put another way, the ‘highest level of citizenship’, according to 
Barbara Roberts, ‘was based on love and loyalty to Canada and to the British Empire; 
the two were inseparable’.4 
 Assimilation was another matter.  Although this term was also used when 
discussing the incorporation of British migrants into Canadian society, this process 
was primarily directed at the believed to be flood waves of central and eastern 
European immigrants with their unpronounceable names, strange languages, and alien 
customs.  Ironically, it was this latter group which adapted more quickly to the 
realities of farming in Canada’s western prairies or had greater forbearance to 
withstand the isolation when exploiting the natural wealth in the extensive forests and 
scattered mining communities of Canada’s north.  British migrants, increasingly from 
the sprawling urban and industrial black spots of Britain, may have possessed the 
cultural pedigree required by Canadians, but they often lacked the requisite skills and 
stamina necessary to develop Canada’s primary resource sector.  Instead, they quickly 
drifted to larger towns and cities competing for jobs in the tertiary and industrial 
sectors of Canada’s burgeoning economy.  This was where many British migrants, 
even before 1918, had made a noticeable and positive contribution to the economic 
growth of Canada - in the foundries and factories, not the farms or forests.  This 
contradiction between the rhetoric of reinforcing a culturally homogenous society 
rooted in the institutions of an Anglo-Saxon heritage fell far short of the realities 
which occurred in the interwar period as the percentage of British migration to Canada 
fell steadily in the face of increasing numbers of non-British migrants who arrived on 
 
 
 
3 
its shores. 
 The tensions which existed between the competing notions of what it was to 
be ‘British’, ‘Canadian’ - or, as John Darwin has posited, the formation of a 
‘Britannic’ identity and nationalism5 - reverberated throughout the increasingly 
strained relations between Britain and Canada over certain aspects of overseas 
settlement policy.  This, in turn, led to conflict rather than cooperation between 
London and Ottawa during the interwar period.  Indeed, these anxieties reflected the 
changing nature of the imperial connection best exemplified by the Balfour Report 
(1926), which gave the dominions equal and autonomous status with the ‘mother 
country’ in a newly emerging multi-centred British Commonwealth.  For many 
historians on both sides of the North Atlantic the political and constitutional 
developments which led Canada to full nationhood, enshrined as they were in the 
Statute of Westminster (1931), are well-known.6  The competing ‘national’ and 
‘imperial’ interests that intensified during the formulation and implementation of 
assisted migration and empire settlement between 1919 and 1939 are also a familiar 
theme.  Nonetheless, scholars are less familiar with how this competition fostered 
acute diplomatic discord between the two nations, especially in the 1920s, that by the 
end of the decade demonstrated that Britain was not able to impose upon the ‘senior 
dominion’ its ‘imperial’ agenda relating to emigration.  Contrastingly, from the 
perspective of leading Canadian officials, in spite of sustained pressure from internal 
and external sources, economics could (and often did) trump ethnicity.   It is these 
competing notions of ‘Britishness’ which makes empire migration so distinctive in the 
chronicles of Anglo-Canadian relations during this period. 
 For too long the ‘nationalist’ shackles, which have often handcuffed those in 
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pursuit of a more fully integrated history of empire, are slowly being loosened.  So, 
too, are those overly metropolitan-centric ideas that over the years have been equally 
constraining.  Spawned, in part, by the criticisms engendered of a new generation of 
transnational historians dissatisfied with the traditional metropolitan-periphery 
mantra, these scholars are beginning to map out the complex cultural contours which 
make up the British World.7  A brief examination of this historiography and its 
reference to empire migration is therefore required to demonstrate how the literature 
has been shaped and developed over the years.  The emphasis here is that during the 
1920s divergences between Canadian and British understandings of the competing 
rationales and mechanics of free and assisted migration became painfully clear to both 
parties, which by 1930, fostered a greater sense of cooperation between the two 
imperial partners.  This, in turn, will help locate this essay in the evolving British 
World literature where the migratory processes and the reactions by host societies is at 
its core.    
 Ian Drummond’s pioneering work published in 1974 remains the benchmark 
on the mounting tensions and anxieties between Britain and the dominions over the 
processes by which the empire settlement programme was established.8  Since then 
historians, historical geographers and political scientists have been chipping away at 
these competing and often contradictory cultural, economic and political cross-
currents involving nation-building and empire.
9
  In recent years, the five volume series 
of the Oxford History of the British Empire, and more especially its companion series, 
has sign posted new and exciting research agendas where a comparative approach has 
been of fundamental importance.10  Certainly, for those companion volumes on 
Canada and Australia, migration has been essential in analysing the journey from 
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colony to nation.11 
 Attention has also concentrated upon particular groups of British migrants and 
specific resettlement schemes which have greatly enhanced the historiography.  The 
scholarship on child migration, youth training schemes, juvenile migration, 
delinquency and deportation of young people from Canada is enormous.12  Religious 
organisations have received welcome attention too.  As well as promoting emigration 
of the ‘right type’ from Britain’s shores, instilling British values was a central role 
played by the Church of England, especially on the Canadian prairies;13 even if this 
meant forming an unholy alliance between Protestant clergy and the Ku Klux Klan in 
1920s Saskatchewan to promote a ‘pure’ Anglo-Saxon race.14  More recently, the role 
of women as both agents and cultural guardians in the operation and administration of 
the migratory process to and in Canada have also been examined.  This includes some 
excellent work on a number of voluntary organizations which either eagerly assisted 
Ottawa in ‘philanthropic policing’ by invoking deportation in their ultimate mission of 
protecting the dominion’s racial purity and national character from degenerate 
‘foreign’ influences; or, those like the Salvation Army, which was unwavering in its 
commitment to see no one deported even if they had committed a moral 
transgression.15   
 Deportation and the growing medicalization of Canada’s immigration 
regulations throughout the 1920s,16 as we shall see, were powerful weapons in 
Canada’s growing arsenal designed to shield its citizenry from the corrupting 
influence of the foreign-born.  This is not to deny the origins of immigration 
restriction policies and the use of deportation of various categories of undesirables 
before 1914.  However, their extensive and coordinated use by Ottawa after 1918 
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demonstrated a growing confidence in Canada to define and legislate for itself what it 
believed were suitable categories of immigrant, even when this openly clashed with 
official British perceptions.  The challenge now is to situate this growing corpus of 
migration literature into what Robert Boyce called the forgotten sources of ‘imperial 
alienation’; seemingly mundane issues which exacerbated relations between London 
and Ottawa after the Great War.
17
  Empire migration was no exception as it was both 
a persistent and controversial irritant in Anglo-Canadian relations at this time. 
 Building upon the scholarly work outlined above, this essay seeks to examine 
a number of inter-related, inter-connected and sometimes contradictory themes.  First, 
and using the assisted passage scheme for ex-service personnel, it explores how 
constructive imperialists in Britain and Canada sought to channel the wartime 
enthusiasm for social reconstruction and regeneration in the immediate aftermath of 
the Great War to reinforce the physical and psychological bonds of empire.  What 
emerges are that a number of competing political aims and objectives were pursued on 
both sides of the North Atlantic, which directly impacted on the spirit of empire 
cooperation that was engendered by the sacrifices made by its citizens in the mud of 
Flanders, Artois and Picardy between 1914 and 1919.  As a result, these vying 
agendas caused friction in the imperial relationship, especially during the years framed 
by the 1923 and 1926 imperial conferences, which threatened to undermine the overall 
aim of binding the two countries closer together.  Running in tandem with the 
investigation of the social and cultural underpinnings of empire settlement, is the 
examination of some of these policies, their successes and failures, and above all their 
impact on Anglo-Canadian relations.  By analysing this intriguing but under-
researched aspect in the evolving relationship between Britain and Canada, new light 
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is shed on a pivotal period when the dominions, led by a restless Canada, became 
equal partners in a newly emerging Empire-Commonwealth. 
 
II 
The campaign to reinforce Canada’s Anglo-Saxon character through a selective 
immigration policy was a potent, ideological weapon in certain sectors of Canadian 
society.  Nativist sentiment, fuelled by racial prejudice, was rampant, particularly in 
western Canada where many trades unionists and farmers had developed a hostile 
attitude towards ‘alien’ immigrants.  Take for example, the perspective of J. H. 
McCulloch, editor-in-chief of the Farmer’s Advocate, published in Winnipeg, 
Manitoba.  He told the leader of the Liberal party, William Lyon Mackenzie King, that 
bringing European peasants to western Canada and ‘conducting a brass band 
campaign in the United States’, would merely cause trouble.  ‘We do not want any 
more European peasants - for the present at least.  An influx of such immigrants, I am 
positive, would inflame the farmers of Western Canada.  What we need is a steady 
stream of selected British immigrants [especially] experienced farmers, possessing 
capital’.18   
 Anxieties and emotions ran high during the increasingly turbulent, sometimes 
violent, labor unrest which engulfed Canada between 1917 and 1919.  Indeed, the 
spectres of unemployment, economic depression, and social unrest which followed in 
the wake of peace galvanized the various nativist associations to combat the largely 
imaginary threat from within.19  In many cases recently returned veterans spearheaded 
anti-alien agitation and by 1918 the Great War Veterans’ Association had eagerly 
accepted the national leadership of the alien question in Canada.20  This anti-alien 
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campaign, however, was not simply about keeping undesirable East Europeans out of 
Canada.  It was about safeguarding Canada’s moral and social fabric, and its destiny 
as a newly-emerging sovereign nation.  This post-war malaise, as Tom Mitchell has 
argued, was interpreted by influential elements within Canada’s business elite and 
their socially conscious middle class allies as a ‘crisis of citizenship’.21 
 Although social compatibility and the willingness to adopt the Canadian way 
of life increased in importance they did not supplant the need to attract a skilled work-
force as the main criteria behind Ottawa’s immigration policy in the immediate post-
war years.  As Canada’s immigration policy became more restrictive, tinged as it was 
with increasing degrees of xenophobia, its architects nevertheless maintained that with 
a return to normality Canada would secure sufficient numbers of agricultural and 
industrial workers either domestically or from the preferred nations of the United 
States, Scandinavia or Great Britain.  However, initial expectations quickly 
evaporated as the economic circumstances of the 1920s limited the scope and success 
of the policy.  In 1919, the optimistic assumption that British immigration would 
return to its pre-war levels was quickly dispelled.  Eventually, over the course of the 
1920s, so too, did the expectations of achieving a culturally homogenous Canada 
rooted in the institutions of an Anglo-Saxon legacy. 
 Yet in the immediate aftermath of the Great War, there were few, if any, 
indications on either side of the Atlantic that the pre-1914 flood tide of British 
migrants would not return.  Moreover, the war itself had provided fertile ground for 
creative ideas directed towards new paths in social planning, reconstruction, self-
sufficiency and empire unity.  Buoyed by this wartime enthusiasm for increased 
imperial cooperation, social imperialists like Lord Alfred Milner, colonial secretary 
 
 
 
9 
between 1919 and 1921, sought to reinvigorate the empire as an aegis of British ideals 
and democracy.22  Under the banner of constructive imperialism, his protégé and 
under-secretary, Leo Amery, implemented one of the few high-minded imperial 
projects to survive the war.  Established in January 1919, and itself a creation of 
wartime imperial cooperation, the Overseas Settlement Committee (OSC) became an 
important instrument in reinforcing the bonds of kith and kin.23 
 One of the first groups singled out by the OSC for assistance were the 
hundreds of thousands of British ex-servicemen and women who were seen as vital in 
buttressing Britishness overseas.  Even the Canadians, who had never been keen on 
free or assisted passage, agreed that granting free passage to those who had unselfishly 
defended the empire in its hour of need was a well-deserved exception to the general 
rule.  However, Ottawa insisted on one important stipulation: demobilized soldiers 
would be granted free passage only if they came to Canada to settle on the land.  This 
pre-condition, lamented the Toronto Star in June 1920, was having a negative effect 
on the large numbers of eager ex-service personnel wanting to come to Canada but 
who did not want to homestead.  It decried that less than 4,000 out of a possible four 
million discharged soldiers had settled in the overseas dominions under the free 
passage provisions.24  Unfortunately for officials in both countries the ex-servicemen’s 
free passage scheme, which operated between 1919 and March 1924, also failed to 
live up to both the numerical and ideological expectations.25   
 Throughout the 1920s, most British politicians were slow to recognize that 
Canada wanted settlers of independent means, people who could make an immediate 
contribution to the economic well-being of the country, and crucially, would not 
become a burden on government resources.  The granting of free passage solely on the 
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criteria of war service - however noble the gesture - did not make economic sense.  In 
the spring of 1920, reports from Hamilton and Toronto warned that a large number of 
penniless British ex-servicemen, many with physical and mental disabilities incurred 
during the war, had landed in Canada and had become a public charge soon after their 
arrival.  In Vancouver it was reported that at least 150 ex-imperials had been left 
stranded; and several had already suffered the humiliation of deportation.  F. C. Blair, 
secretary of the department of immigration and colonization, argued forcefully that 
Canada’s deteriorating economic circumstances necessitated the adoption of a well 
defined entry policy.  ‘We are supposed to understand the labour market of this 
country and we are morally obliged to protect not only the workers already here, but 
even more so the workers seeking to come’.26   
 Therefore, in May 1920, when Ottawa announced that it was prepared under 
the provisions of the ex-service free passage scheme to encourage only agriculturists, 
household workers and such skilled workers as could not be secured in Canada, Blair 
was articulating the competing interests which would hound Anglo-Canadian relations 
over empire migration.  ‘To relax our policy opens the door wider than I think it is 
wise to open it at the present time.  It is an admission that we are encouraging the 
immigration of all classes outside and beyond the three classes above referred to.  I do 
not think we can afford to adopt this [laissez faire] attitude…’27  Many in Ottawa 
agreed with Blair’s insistence that Canada - and Canada alone - had the right to 
control who entered the country, whatever the countervailing pressures from London.  
Empire migration had become an ideological battleground for competing dominion 
and imperial interests which sought to mould and shape policy in accordance with 
their respective domestic political agendas.  
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III 
The poor results achieved under the ex-servicemen’s free passage scheme raised 
doubts in the minds of a growing number of Whitehall officials about Canadian 
attitudes towards assisted immigration in general and British immigration in 
particular.  The 15 percent fall in emigration from Britain to Canada, recorded in 
1922-3, seemed to confirm these suspicions.  However, in 1923 Prime Minister 
Mackenzie King and his Liberal administration took steps to cooperate with the 
British government under the auspices of the Empire Settlement Act, a landmark piece 
of legislation inaugurated in 1922, which extended free passage assistance to civil 
migration for the next fifteen years.  Yet, why the sudden change in Canadian attitudes 
and policy?  Important changes had taken place in the Canadian domestic arena.  First, 
the economy began to turn itself around after the short, sharp post-war depression of 
1920-2.  More importantly, the predominantly rural-based Progressive party,28 whom 
King relied on for parliamentary support and which had been hostile to all expenditure 
on immigration, experienced a change of heart.  Fearful of rural depopulation, 
particularly on the prairies, party leaders were scared that the Progressive’s political 
power base would be eroded, subsequently weakening rural Canada’s voice in Ottawa. 
 Moreover, many Canadians had been lured southward during the depression of 1920-
2.  The Dillingham Law (1923), which introduced a quota system, effectively shut 
American borders to foreign immigrants, but not Canadians.  Nativists feared that 
Canada would be left with the dross of recent European arrivals while Canadians fled 
in droves to find better paying jobs in the United States. 
 Ottawa, in fact, had much to be alarmed about.  In 1900, Canadians were the 
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third largest ethnic group in the United States, after the Irish and German 
communities.  Between 1861 and 1931 it has been estimated that the net migration of 
Canadian-born to the United States was a staggering 2,080,000.  Even more striking 
by 1900, there were 788,000 Anglo-Canadians living south of the border making up 8 
percent of America’s foreign-born.  As one Canadian geographer has so aptly put it, 
this invisible migration of over two million Canadians to the United States had 
occurred ‘with scarcely a ripple’.29  The haemorrhaging of the nation’s life-blood 
southward combined with the massive influx of immigrants into Canada whose 
origins were not Anglo-Saxon alarmed many Canadians who feared that, if left 
unchecked could lead to the balkanization of the young dominion.  Not surprising 
then, that throughout 1923 demands increased for a concerted immigration policy 
aimed at attracting quality British settlers to counteract the problem.30  Endeavours to 
stimulate British immigration had become a lively topic across the dominion, where 
British migrants of the ‘old breed, self-reliant and adaptable’ would be privileged.31 
 Emphasizing that the first step of the new policy would be to make a careful 
survey of the countries from which it was proposed to draw settlers, Charles Stewart, 
acting federal minister of immigration and colonization, announced that a second key 
step was to hold a conference of immigration officials and field workers at which 
‘each year’s programme would be mapped out’.32  W. J. Black, the deputy minister of 
immigration and colonization welcomed this positive stance.  Over the past two to 
three years he admitted that the various agencies in his department had been engaged 
mainly in restricting the emigration of those who would have increased the ranks of 
the unemployed in Canada.  Complaining that ‘too little has been done to encourage 
those of a class who at any time could have been assimilated’, he was equally critical 
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that hardly any migration propaganda had been carried out in the British Isles over the 
past year.  In his judgment this had been a grave mistake as there were ‘substantial 
reasons, other than from an emigration standpoint, why this country should be kept 
before the British people’.33  The prominence given to selected immigration and land 
settlement by Ottawa reflected that immigration was still seen as the cure-all for 
Canada’s financial troubles, which had been exacerbated by a sizeable war debt.  
Quite simply, a larger population would disperse the burden of national debt more 
widely and generate increased government receipts in the future.34 
 Reforms were also made in London to better coordinate Canadian migration 
policy.  In February 1922, Sir George Perley stepped down as Canada’s high 
commissioner in London.  He was replaced by the prominent Ontario Liberal and 
former vice-president of the Salada Tea Company, Peter C. Larkin (1922-30).  The 
change of personnel provided Mackenzie King with an opportunity, based on grounds 
of economy and efficiency, to reign in a number of government departments who had 
separate offices in London, which, he claimed, had become practically independent 
from the high commission.  These departments, whose offices were scattered around 
central London, included immigration, the board of pension commissioners, trade and 
commerce, and soldiers’ civil re-establishment.  Ideally, Ottawa wanted all these 
operations concentrated under one roof, and Larkin was determined to find savings 
wherever he could; particularly in the London emigration office which alone 
employed fifty-four staff out of a total of 103 nation-wide.35  This centralization would 
not happen until June 1925 when everyone was relocated to Trafalgar Square upon the 
completion of Canada House – christened ‘Larkin’s folly’ by many Canadians resident 
in London.36  Nevertheless, Larkin was determined to get to grips with the sprawling 
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bureaucracy. 
 At first, the results were encouraging.  The British press devoted wide 
coverage to Canada’s change in attitude and the renewed interest was demonstrated by 
a 100 percent increase in British emigration during 1923-4.  Heartened by its success, 
the Canadian government embarked upon a policy of preference for British 
immigrants on the Atlantic routes.  One obvious indicator of Canada’s increased 
immigration activities, primarily directed at farming opportunities in the dominion, 
was the huge injection of money into its advertizing and publicity campaigns for 
1923: $760,000 up from $350,000 the year before.37  The high commissioner also 
became more involved.  Larkin, who found public speaking difficult, was kept busy 
on emigration work throughout 1923.  ‘I have always advocated strongly the 
emigration of people willing to work on the land’, he wrote to Mackenzie King in 
May, ‘and lately [I] have been adding that builders and building employees are also 
badly wanted’.38 
 There was another reason why Larkin was focusing on emigration in his public 
speeches.  The ever sensitive King had received a number of reports that his political 
opponents in both Britain and Canada were beginning a whispering campaign, 
claiming that immigration from the United Kingdom was not desired by his 
administration.  It was further rumoured that Larkin, in private conversations with 
British officials, was confirming that this was in fact the case.  King instructed Larkin 
that the matter had become serious enough to warrant a counter-offensive.  When the 
appropriate occasions presented it, Larkin was to make a series of public statements 
on Canada’s desire to receive, ‘in large numbers as may find it possible to come, the 
right class of immigrants, from the British Isles’.  As the ‘busy-bodies are at work 
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seeking to sow seeds of distrust’, and in advance of the Imperial Economic 
Conference to be held later in the year, the prime minister had thought it well not to 
delay bringing this matter to Larkin’s attention.39  Over the next several months Larkin 
- who was personally not in favour of assisted migration because this category of 
settler was adjudged to be physically and mentally weaker than those who had 
independent means - made several high profile speeches on Canadian immigration 
policy emphasizing Canada’s desire to obtain the ‘right classes’ of immigrant.  King 
called them timely and thought they had wrong footed the whisperers and their 
negative propaganda campaign that was creating prejudice against the Canadian 
government and its high commissioner.40 
 Although assisted immigration rose, the overall results were disappointing as 
the total number of British immigrants declined by 38 percent in 1924-5.41  This was 
immediately seized upon by British officials for two reasons.  There were 1.5 million 
unemployed in the United Kingdom and indications were it would deepen with the 
onset of winter.  This and the worsening economic situation enshrouded the six weeks 
of proceedings at the Imperial Economic Conference held in London between 
October-November 1923.  Mackenzie King, in conversations with the British prime 
minister Stanley Baldwin, recorded in his diary at the beginning of the conference that 
Baldwin was keen to work with the dominions in solving some of the economic woes 
which the empire faced.  Encouraged by the good will and positive response of the 
dominion leaders to Britain’s plight, he told King that a crucial step along the road to 
recovery was that Britain ‘must get rid of some of her population’.42  However, no 
firm promises or initiatives were finalized because Baldwin called a snap election 
shortly after the conference.  His defeat and the coming to power of Ramsay 
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MacDonald’s short-lived Labour government did not change the growing British 
criticism of Canada’s restrictive immigration policy.  Lucien Pacaud, Larkin’s 
secretary in London, informed Mackenzie King’s private secretary, F. A. McGregor, 
that MacDonald warned the dominion high commissioners that if there was to be any 
large-scale emigration from Britain, that the dominions ‘must be prepared to accept 
representatives of the mass of the population rather than continue the present system 
of selecting only the best and most skilled’.43 
 This would never happen.  Canada had its own economic problems.  Besides, 
as Blair outlined to O. D. Skelton, the newly appointed under-secretary of state for 
external affairs, even if Canada tried to inaugurate the settlement of 50,000 British 
settlers on individual holdings in 1924, it was an impossible task.  For one, the 
administrative machinery was simply not there.  Secondly, at a time when free 
homestead lands were not in the quantities they were prior to 1914, when railway 
construction was slow and investment capital scarce, without state aided settlement 
the difficulties of settling such large numbers were magnified.  Finally, Blair insisted 
that whether the intending settler had capital or not, it was essential that he should 
gain experience in Canadian agricultural methods before undertaking settlement on 
his own.  Blair concluded that ‘[c]arefully planned settlement will produce results 
which will be cumulative’,44 but it took time and patience.  This was something 
British officials (and migrants) consistently failed to appreciate. 
 The second criticism levelled at Canada’s immigration policies by some 
British commentators in the mid-1920s was that the increased screening and 
regulation of the types and numbers of British migrants the dominion was prepared to 
take was having a detrimental affect on the purity of its Anglo-Saxon stock.  During a 
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tour of Canada in the autumn of 1925 one observer recorded that there was ‘a general 
feeling in Canada that the present immigration policy is failing.  The weak point is the 
proportion between British and Foreign born immigrants, rather than the total number 
of immigrants…If Canada is to remain British in sentiment, it must remain British in 
racial origin’.45  The Right Reverend Dr G. E. Lloyd, Bishop of Saskatchewan, 
confirmed these fears.  The state of Canada’s immigration policy was so 
unsatisfactory that according to his estimates only 25 percent of the population in 
western Canada were British.  Upon completion of an empire tour in 1926-7, the 
Bishop of London, the Reverend Arthur Foley Winnington-Ingram, agreed and felt 
that the British element in the dominion was not strong enough and needed 
reinforcing.46  One thing however was beyond dispute.  According to Lieutenant-
Colonel J. H. Stanley, the organizing director of the Church of England’s Council of 
Empire Settlement who accompanied the outspoken bishop on his tour, the Church of 
England had to demonstrate that it could act imperially and hence it ‘must leave no 
efforts untried to bind Canada [closer] to the Mother Country’ and keep Canada 
British at heart.47   
 At one level the Bishop of London’s observations about the dilution of the 
British element in Canada seemed valid.  In September 1925, the Liberal government, 
which was fighting an election campaign, was blackmailed into signing a three-year 
agreement with Canada’s two transcontinental railway companies, the Canadian 
Pacific Railway (CPR) and the Canadian National Railway, to recruit prospective 
agriculturalists from the non-preferred immigrant categories.  Between 1925 and 1930 
(after the extension of the agreement in September 1928) approximately 185,000 
people from Russia, the Baltic States, central and south-eastern Europe entered 
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Canada under the terms of the controversial agreement.  Even the religious sects such 
as the Mennonites and Hutterites, excluded in 1919, were begrudgingly welcomed 
back.  Representatives of these companies were given the authority to issue 
occupational certificates and entry permits, which officials at the department of 
immigration and colonization claimed not only undermined their authority in these 
matters; but, it was alleged, the policy was a sinister attempt by the railway companies 
to demolish Canada’s selective immigration policy.  Public reaction was mixed, but as 
the decade advanced and the economy showed signs of flagging, the Canadian 
Conservative party under the leadership of R. B. Bennett used this issue as a club with 
which to attack King’s Liberals.  Bennett charged that immigration could not be left to 
private sector interests.  Moreover, these immigrants posed a serious threat to 
Canada’s Anglo-Saxon character.48 
 These criticisms chimed with more disturbing news reaching Ottawa in August 
1927 that the Ku Klux Klan and the Orange Order were spreading propaganda 
throughout the prairies, especially in Saskatchewan, that the Catholic Church was 
controlling the activities of both the federal and provincial governments.  The Liberal 
premier of Saskatchewan, Jimmy Gardiner, was unsure if any political harm would 
befall either the federal or provincial Liberals, but this anti-Catholic campaign, much 
of which was directed at the large influx of Ukrainians, was worrying nonetheless.49  
This alarmism was tempered somewhat by the observations of Canada’s governor-
general, Lord Willingdon, after his tour to western Canada in the spring of 1927, 
where he found a ‘most splendid spirit and atmosphere’.50  A year later in the rapidly 
developing Peace River country of north-western Alberta, he had found very few 
southern Europeans.  Settlers were of the ‘right sort’, with the basis of development 
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and the settlers’ sentiment ‘strongly British’.51  Willingdon reported to Amery that all 
the warnings he had heard about the want of loyalty on the prairies were really ‘all 
moonshine’.  For he had found the ‘most wonderful loyalty and welcome’ wherever 
he had travelled.  ‘Of course’, he cautioned, ‘it is a fact that if economic conditions are 
good, the possibilities and probabilities of agitation are minimised and people are 
inclined to be satisfied’.52   
 However, Whitehall’s worst fears seemed to be confirmed when the 
department of immigration and colonization released its annual report for 1926.  It 
noted that for the first time since 1902 British immigration was surpassed by foreign 
intake.53  This was indeed a worrying trend to one senior official in the dominion land 
settlement branch and a former chairman of the Soldier Settlement Board, Major John 
Barnett.  In his opinion, ‘unless very definite action is taken to stimulate the flow of 
British people to Canada in the immediate future I feel that the Empire interests [sic] 
in North America are going to suffer very seriously’.  Barnett was also alarmed that 
Ottawa was showing little interest in immigration matters, lamenting that whatever 
steps were taken would have to be initiated by the British.  Furthermore, progress 
would only be achieved by initiating schemes through provincial auspices rather than 
through the federal government.54   
 Equally blistering criticisms were being levelled against ministers in Ottawa 
and high commissioner Larkin by senior immigration staff in London.  J. Obed Smith 
and J. Bruce Walker were exceptionally critical of those at the helm.  Upon his 
retirement in late 1924 as superintendent of emigration for Canada in London, Obed 
Smith charged that there was a distinct lack of enterprise and esprit de corps in Ottawa 
which he felt had undermined his work in Great Britain in recent years.  Despite the 
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doubling of the advertising budget for the 1924 season, he alleged that efforts were 
being hampered by what he claimed were ineffective propaganda strategies.  
Furthermore, he charged that no one in authority understood this vital element of 
immigration work.  Walker, who replaced Smith and became Canada’s director of 
European emigration, agreed claiming that the deputy minister of immigration and 
colonization, W. J. Egan, knew nothing about ‘the science of advertising, and thinks 
money for that purpose is practically wasted’.  Larkin, in Walker’s eyes, was equally 
ignorant of the need to advertise, despite his long career in business.  He ‘thinks 
advertising Salada tea and the Dominion of Canada [are] two different things’.55  
 There was another depressing trend in British migration patterns to Canada.  
‘There is an aspect to the phase of the Immigration problem one can hardly mention in 
public’, confided Robert Forke, the minister of immigration and colonization, to J. W. 
Dafoe, editor of the influential Manitoba Free Press, ‘and that is that our English 
immigrants do not stay on the land’.56  As one disgruntled British official wrote: 
 
In a sense we have to face a crisis in our relations with Canada over the 
Empire Settlement Act.  We, on the one side, want to put most of our 
money into assisted passage, training and aftercare.  They, on the other 
hand, have made it clear to us that they consider the assistance on 
passages should be lessened and that all the money we have to spend 
should go into land settlement.57 
 
Amery, appointed as secretary of state for both the colonial and dominions offices 
with Stanley Baldwin’s re-election in November 1924, was much more critical of 
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Canadian attitudes and policies.  In January 1925 he told Willingdon’s controversial 
predecessor as governor-general, Lord Byng of Vimy, that he despaired about 
Canadian attitudes towards promoting British migration to the dominion.  ‘I cannot 
help feeling that there is a certain lack of the sense of proportion in dealing with this 
matter’.  However excellent Ottawa’s announcement that it would initiate a 
government-sponsored programme designed to settle 3,000 British farming families, 
this was not going to ‘build up the country very fast as against an exodus of two or 
three hundred thousand across the [United States] border’.58  Furthermore, despite the 
Canadian government’s renewed interest in promoting British immigration, he 
believed that the isolationist Mackenzie King and the uninspiring Egan, were the main 
obstacles preventing greater co-operation and co-ordination between the two 
governments.  After all, many leading British politicians knew King to be ‘a slippery 
customer and very weak in his Imperial faith’.59   
 The most serious irritant between Britain and Canada was the latter’s stringent 
medical requirements.  British authorities alleged that Canadian immigration officials 
were over-zealous in carrying out medical examinations.  On the surface, there was a 
grain of truth to these charges.  The 1920s witnessed a steady stream of regulations 
designed to curb the entry of a host of undesirable elements.  Alcoholics, conspirators, 
and illiterates were denied entry after 1919.  Asian and black immigration was non-
existent.  To ensure that these and other non-preferred races were discouraged, J. D. 
Pagé, a long-standing medical superintendent, suggested to the deputy minister of 
health, Dr J. A. Amyot, that Canadian immigration officials adopt the very successful 
American practice of daylight inspection for all examination work.  Not only would 
this make the inspection process more efficient; but ‘daylight is necessary to enable an 
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Immigration Inspector to appreciate the significance of the hue of the people passing 
before him when it may be the only sign that may lead him to detect some serious 
underlying conditions’.60 
 
IV 
Problems continued to plague Anglo-Canadian attempts to promote overseas 
settlement and migration.  Despite the increase in assisted immigration after 1925, as a 
result of an agreement signed between the two governments and the shipping 
companies which reduced Atlantic fares by 80 percent, it was clear that the type of 
British immigrant arriving in Canada was unsuited or unwilling to embark upon an 
agricultural career.  Amery, for one, had always advocated the need for some form of 
preliminary farm training in the United Kingdom before any emigrant’s departure to 
Canada.  Throughout 1926, in conversations with senior Canadian politicians and 
business leaders, he continually reiterated the need for closer cooperation in this all-
important aspect.  In March 1926 he chatted to that ‘vain old bore’, the leading Liberal 
senator, Raoul Dandurand, ‘who was full of talk’ about the need for training British 
migrants prior to their departure for Canada.  Amery quipped:  ‘I wonder how far he 
really wants them!’61 
 Next month, during a lunch hosted by Amery at his London residence in Eaton 
Square, a number of officials from the Canadian high commission and OSC were 
invited to discuss migration issues.  Although no definite conclusions were reached, 
there was a consensus that the ‘senior dominion’ could take ‘an unlimited number of 
youths’ whom would first be given some preliminary training in agriculture.  ‘It is 
interesting to see’, recorded Amery, ‘that the Dominions have now generally swung 
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round to the idea of some sort of training here which they always rejected before’.62  
However, that October, when Amery intervened during a meeting of the OSC with an 
appeal that the dominions share in the cost of training, Blair, who was in attendance, 
answered in a ‘very flat negative’.63  Ottawa’s intransigence was becoming frustrating. 
 In a conversation with Edward Beatty, chairman of the CPR, and whose company was 
a major player in migration and settlement, Amery spoke ‘very frankly’ about 
Canada’s abject failure to do anything effective in the way of promoting British 
migration.  Beatty agreed, emphasizing the need for a Canadian government with 
some convictions.64 
 Unfortunately for Amery, events were to conspire against him; events which 
reinforced Canada’s increasingly restrictive immigration stance.  The General Strike 
of 1926, caused by an acrimonious coal strike which long outlasted it, not only 
undermined the United Kingdom’s economic recovery, but it also seriously impacted 
upon empire settlement.  Protracted difficulties in the coal industry meant that there 
would be a substantial deficit at the close of the 1925-6 fiscal year.  Furthermore, it 
was predicted that there was a real possibility that these difficulties would carry over 
into the next making it hard for the British government to balance revenue and 
expenditure.  These unforeseen difficulties necessitated restrictions on government 
spending, and hence, impinged on the dominions office’s capacity to fulfil all of its 
empire settlement projects, including the establishment of its UK-based settler 
training and migrant testing centres, many of which were aimed at unemployed coal 
miners.  All that the dominions office could do for its 1926-7 projections was to 
‘express a pious hope that the desired centres may be started as soon as financial 
exigencies permit’.65 
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 ‘The problem’, according to one dominions office memorandum, ‘is to convert 
a large part of our industrialized population into a rural population engaged in 
agriculture’.66  As a result, in September 1926 the chairman of the OSC, Lord 
Clarendon, and his deputy, T. C. Macnaghten, met with Egan and his officials in 
Ottawa to explore this very issue.  High on the agenda were those opportunities for 
British migrants other than farm workers, such as coal miners, construction workers, 
and general laborers.  Clarendon noted that there was great demand for labor in 
northern Canada’s ‘bush’ camps.  Ottawa had been diligently trying to persuade 
Canadian transportation companies to secure suitable British settlers for this type of 
work.  However, several unnamed companies considered British settlers ill-adapted to 
‘bush’ work, as many could not handle an axe.67  Although no ‘spectacular’ progress 
was accomplished during the conference, Clarendon was convinced that meeting 
around a table tackling immigration problems face-to-face created a better 
understanding between the two parties that extensive letter writing could never 
accomplish.68  The fact remained however that bridging the conceptual gap that 
existed between the two countries over appropriate migration strategies was going to 
take more than the occasional face-to-face meeting.  
 Equally challenging for the British government was to overcome the ‘mistaken 
belief’ that migration was simply a cure for the United Kingdom’s unemployment.  In 
a long and detailed rebuttal by the ministry of labour, which challenged the need for 
state-aided migration, officials noted how the British government was ‘being 
continually pressed to adopt grandiose schemes of overseas settlement in order to 
increase the numbers who migrate’.  Within the same breath it noted one of the great 
ironies underpinning state-aided migration to Canada: ‘there is something lacking in a 
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policy of State-assisted migration when, as in the case of Canada, more people go out 
without assistance than with assistance’.  If anything, according to the ministry of 
labour, there had been a decrease in migration with the empire since the Great War.  
Even more damning, there had been no substantial increase in numbers since the 
enactment of the Empire Settlement Act in 1922.69  
 More searching questions were asked by the ministry of labour, which probed 
further Amery’s and the dominions office’s seemingly unswerving support for state-
aided migration.  For it, the central defect of the 1922 Act, and any scheme of state-
assisted migration where central government was required to find a substantial 
proportion of a migrant’s travel costs, was that migration became ‘subjected to all 
manner of capricious political restrictions’, many of which were founded upon a 
completely false economic basis.  ‘As the Act is administered between Governments it 
is necessary for Governments to respect each other’s political difficulties’.70 
 The dominions, like the rest of the world, had experienced trade dislocation 
after the Great War.  This had resulted in considerable intermittent employment and 
unemployment, mainly in the cities, ‘in itself a powerful deterrent to migration’.  This, 
argued ministry of labour officials, was naturally accompanied by a strengthening of 
the political power of the labor movement in the dominions, especially Australia, 
which was anxious to safeguard their members from a possible flooding of the 
employment market and a downward pressure on wages.  Therefore it was not 
surprising that the dominions would be sensitive to domestic trade union pressure and 
hence were bound to be restrictive when it came to official migration policies.71  This 
did not mean that Britain’s industrial or urban unemployed were prevented from 
immigrating to Canada.  Provided they were healthy and had previous agricultural 
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experience or training, no limitations were placed upon them.  However, in the 
depressed industries such as textiles, shipbuilding, and coal mining the ministry of 
labour seriously doubted that previous agricultural experience was likely to be found 
in many cases.  Such restrictions meant that the numbers of men from these 
occupations who thought they had a chance of breaking out of their present economic 
circumstances through assisted migration to Canada was limited by the capacity of the 
British government to finance requisite training schemes.72  Ironically, the General 
Strike of 1926 had put pay to most of these initiatives.   
 If the ministry of labour’s stinging analyses were not enough to dampen 
dominions office enthusiasm, in May 1927, the Free Press Evening Bulletin headlined 
a bizarre incident involving two British Great War pensioners who were enroute to 
Canada to start a new life.  The two veterans were alleged to have used revolvers to 
shoot seagulls during the voyage.  Both men, who had purchased these weapons prior 
to embarkation, were promptly relieved of the firearms by immigration officials upon 
their arrival in Canada.  However, the Bulletin could not resist taking what was now a 
familiar jibe at the British migrants’ ignorance of their new environment.     
 
What foresight and … knowledge of Canadian conditions is shown in 
the apportioning of forty-five dollars for revolvers!  And this is part of 
the plan to protect the funds of the pensioners and see that they are not 
spent improperly! … In some official quarters in Britain there must be a 
weird idea of the dangers in Canada from bears, from warlike Indians 
or from outlaws in the less settled parts…With such a great desire in 
both countries to promote British emigration to Canada, it is surprising 
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that there should be such lack of understanding of conditions in 
Canada.73 
 
 Undaunted, Amery hoped that his forthcoming ‘Empire pilgrimage’,74 which 
began in July 1927, would help becalm these troubled migration waters.  When he 
returned home in February 1928 he confided in his diary that he thought he had made 
real progress in Canada, ‘more perhaps than anywhere else except possibly South 
Africa, in quickening the consciousness of Empire and the sense of its possibilities’.75 
 To His Majesty King George V, however, he admitted that he had been rather 
anxious about the Canadian part of the tour, as in Canada, more than anywhere else it 
was difficult ‘to avoid saying nothing without getting into controversy’.  Amery noted 
that Prime Minister King had been ‘most friendly, indeed, delighted with everything I 
said, and we had some most useful talks.  He is a man whom one can only deal with in 
conversation’, observed Amery.76  Impressed with the calibre of most of King’s 
cabinet, he was roundly disappointed with the minister of immigration, Robert Forke, 
a farmer from Pipestone, Manitoba, and leader of the Progressive party.  In Amery’s 
opinion, Forke was the ‘weakest vessel’ in the Canadian cabinet, and one who 
unfortunately, was ‘entirely under the thumb of his Deputy Minister, Egan, an able 
Irish Catholic bureaucrat whose whole outlook on the [migration] problem is 
negative’.77 
 Amery’s perception that his proto-Keynesian ideas on bringing the empire 
closer together through imperial preference, protectionism and increased migration 
had been received favourably in the dominions, including Canada, were quickly 
dispelled however by British newspaper reports that Ottawa was to introduce a new, 
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more restrictive set of entry regulations in the coming season.  The Times feared that 
these regulations would reduce British emigration to Canada between 30 and 50 
percent.78  The row centred upon the introduction of a fresh set of medical guidelines 
and procedures.  Previously, those intending to migrate to Canada had to either 
undergo a medical examination, which was performed in the United Kingdom by a 
roster of approximately 1,500 British doctors, or subject themselves to an examination 
upon arrival in Canada.  This system was to be replaced in mid-February 1928 by a 
compulsory examination prior to embarkation by one of a team of only eighteen 
Canadian doctors contracted by Ottawa and coordinated by the chief medical officer 
based at the high commission in London.  Furthermore, all British migrants, whether 
under assisted schemes or at their own expense, were obliged to undergo a thorough 
medical examination at a predetermined time at one of the designated medical centres 
which the Canadian doctors would visit at regular intervals.  The Times complained 
that many people who wished to go out and settle in Canada ‘would hesitate before 
going and submitting themselves, their wives, and their children to examination by a 
strange doctor in a strange place’.  Delays would be inevitable, it remonstrated, and 
there was no guarantee that the examinations would be completed in one day if the 
medical examiner had scores of applicants to process.  This would either force many 
candidates to stay overnight, incurring the added expense and inconvenience of 
finding food and lodging for themselves and their families in an ‘undesirable place’;79 
or, as one editorial in the Western Daily Press protested, applicants would have to 
suffer the vexation of queuing only to have their examination postponed for several 
weeks, forcing them to make another journey.80  The Morning Post was more hyper-
critical.  It claimed that the elaborate new medical machinery covered ‘some political 
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design against British emigrants’.81 
 These misgivings about the new regulations and the discouraging message 
they were sending to respectable, would-be applicants echoed throughout a number of 
provincial newspapers, many of which were located in prime recruiting areas.  In 
Scotland, the Greenock Telegraph claimed that the new system was a barrier to 
emigration.  Although it commended the implementation of a more thorough medical 
examination at British ports of embarkation - thus preventing ‘unnecessary suffering 
and inconvenience’ for those who in the past had been turned away upon their arrival 
in Canada and had been deported ‘homeless and workless’ - the crucial defect, it 
alleged, was that the intending settlers had to answer in triplicate some ninety 
questions and produce identification forms containing a photograph before undergoing 
the physical examination.82  The Shipping World insisted that Canada had made a 
grave mistake in ‘introducing an irritating scheme of medical examination of 
prospective migrants, and insisting upon the production of a passport with a portrait’.  
The Glasgow Evening News decried that ‘apparently the Canadians are not satisfied 
now that we are giving them the very best plums in our basket…Hunting the Canadian 
Doctor is a new sport our people will have to train for more actively than tossing the 
caber, and for the tug-of-war at Highland gatherings’.83   
 The competing and, at times, contradictory interests which underpinned the 
growing tensions witnessed in Anglo-Canadian relations concerning migration and 
overseas settlement continued to be played out at the highest governmental levels 
throughout 1928.  In early August, after several delays, Lord Lovat, the chairman of 
the OSC and parliamentary under-secretary of the colonial office, arrived in Canada to 
discuss how best to increase British migration to the ‘senior dominion’.  Accompanied 
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by G. F. Plant, the secretary of the OSC (who was to return home after the Canadian 
leg), and Francis Skevington, a principal secretary at the treasury and its representative 
on the OSC, at the top of Lovat’s agenda was Canada’s new medical regulations.  
According to William Noxon, the Ontario agent-general in London, the overwhelming 
view in Britain was that the extremely selective immigration regulations combined 
with the thorough medical inspections now required before embarkation was proof 
positive that Canada did not want British migrants.84   
 The introduction in February 1928 of the new system of compulsory medical 
inspection prior to departure had been discussed by Canadian officials at the 
departments of health, and immigration and colonization ever since 1926.  At first 
only those under government-assisted passage schemes such as children and 
unaccompanied women would be obliged to undergo the compulsory medical 
examination.  This comprised about one-quarter of all British arrivals in 1926-7.  
Additional funds were allocated to augment the new system, which Ottawa hoped 
would make the entire process more efficient and cost effective.85  An internal review 
carried out in April 1928 by A. L. Jolliffe, commissioner of immigration in London, 
concluded that despite the adverse publicity in the British press over the past winter 
the new system of medical inspection was working well.  Furthermore he had failed to 
discover any evidence that the procedures now in effect were acting as a deterrent to 
immigration.  Admittedly, there were valid complaints over the new inspection 
system, which many migrants found inconvenient.  The high commission responded 
by introducing several steps to improve the service; such as keeping longer hours in 
some examination centres plus adding twenty doctors to the register to increase 
geographic cover and range.  Jolliffe concluded that when compared with figures from 
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early 1927, the Canadian doctors had examined 1,000 more assisted migrants than 
their British counterparts had on the old roster system the year before.  If the numbers 
of enquiries were up, argued Jolliffe, this hardly signified that the new regulations 
were dragging numbers down.  Confident that the new system was working much 
more effectively, he told Egan, that the list of difficulties he had investigated were in 
his opinion ‘to a large extent anticipations rather than realities’.86 
 When Lovat met with Canadian officials in Ottawa in late August 1928 he 
unveiled his plans to stimulate a major land settlement project aimed at settling British 
miners on farms in Canada.  Arguing that there was ‘a large supply of really suitable 
persons’ in the United Kingdom, he revealed that the British cabinet had sanctioned 
an additional £600,000 outside the normal expenditure on overseas settlement, 
training and reduced passage.  The conference minutes reveal detailed and wide-
ranging discussions on a host of immigration schemes and issues.  One key success 
was an agreement to continue giving preference to British migrants by reducing trans-
Atlantic tariffs to £10 for third-class fares.  Another involved the thorny issue over the 
deportation of unwed mothers.  Egan stated that everything possible was done to avoid 
the deportation of these women, ‘unless there was evidence of constant immorality 
and of disease’.  For instance, he pointed out that for every 100 deportation orders 
issued in this category only a small percentage were ever executed.  When Lovat tried 
to tackle his Canadian hosts by the wholesale condemnation of the new medical 
inspection system, and suggested that the examinations be carried out by British 
doctors, he got nowhere.  Ottawa stood resolute in its determination to control this 
process.87  
 Frustrated by Ottawa’s intransigence to embark upon ‘big’ colony schemes, or 
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allow an increased role for voluntary organizations, Lovat had to remain content that 
some progress had been made in further developing current empire migration policy.  
At the very least, during the two months he spent in Canada it had allowed him to 
make a ten-day trip to the Peace River country in north-western Alberta, and to visit a 
few of the sponsored settlements dotted throughout the prairies; especially the 
Clandonald colony at Vermilion, Alberta, inaugurated by the Scottish Immigrant Aid 
Society and established in partnership with the CPR, where 100 Scottish families had 
been settled on 100 purpose-built farms.88  In the end, however, Lovat’s trip to Canada 
had been largely unsuccessful, which was to be compounded by the miserable failure 
of the 1928 miner-harvesters’ scheme.89  Worn out, he left Canada in early October for 
New Zealand, where ill health forced him to truncate his New Zealand tour and cancel 
his onward journey to Australia.90  
 To make matters worse, in July 1929, Sir William Clark, Britain’s first high 
commissioner in Canada - and the new conduit between the two governments 
involving migration matters - reported a candid conversation he had had with Egan.  
The deputy minister revealed to Clark that he had always been opposed to assisted 
migration.  He claimed that from the very beginning the grant of assistance would be 
fatal for the development of immigration from the United Kingdom.  In the last two 
years alone, public opinion throughout Canada had crystallized and had become 
increasingly vocal against assisted migration.  A similar trend had been mirrored over 
the past several years in the debates within the Canadian House of Commons.  
Furthermore, Egan firmly believed that assisted migration produced a less reliable 
type of immigrant, which was less frequently found among the unassisted.  To 
reinforce his point, he informed Clark that of the 668 deportees recorded in 1928-9, all 
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had been British and all had been assisted migrants.91  Egan had been stretching the 
truth here.  In 1928-9 there had been a total of 1,964 deportations of which 1,083 or 
55 per cent were British, involving both assisted and unassisted migrants.  
Nonetheless, despite these modest deportation figures for 1929, the number of 
deportations involving British migrants, especially those who had been assisted, had 
been rising steadily throughout the 1920s.  For instance, of the total number of British 
deports for 1929, 61 percent were assisted migrants.92 
 If these figures were depressing, what about the administrative costs involved 
in settling a British family in Canada?  The OSC was informed by the CPR, which 
operated its own settlement schemes through its subsidiary the Canada Colonization 
Association, that the costs in settling a British family on the prairies were five times 
higher than that of a family from continental Europe.  Even more alarming, there was 
a notable decline in the numbers of British settlers participating in these schemes.  Of 
the 2,667 settlers who were assisted by the CPR between 1925 and 1928, only 44 were 
of British origin.93  Canadian departmental figures for 1927 revealed an even more 
disturbing picture.  It was estimated that it cost $17 for each migrant from the British 
Isles to be settled in Canada, compared with just 15 cents for each newcomer from the 
continent!94  The cost of landing one British migrant in Canada was the equivalent of 
landing 113 central and south-eastern Europeans.  By the close of the decade the odds 
seemed to be stacked against the British government in its desire to increase the flow 
of its citizens to Canada. 
 The flurry of British ministerial activity in Canada over the summer and 
autumn of 1928, and Lovat’s idea of a ‘big’ colony on the Canadian plains was, as Ian 
Drummond discovered, driven by Whitehall’s urgent need to find ways of alleviating 
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Britain’s chronic unemployment in the run up to a general election.95  However, as we 
have seen, Lovat’s scheme was rejected by Ottawa as impracticable and ‘politically 
objectionable’;96 thus thwarting the Baldwin government’s fantasy that large-scale 
British migration and settlement to Canada would help solve its deepening 
unemployment crisis.  Interestingly, it was the treasury official, Francis Skevington, 
who pointed the way forward.  Migration, he told his superiors, could not be forced.  
In the future, as in the past, ‘the limits of migration will be set by the openings in the 
dominions, and that there is little that can be done usefully under the Empire 
Settlement Act to extend these openings’.  What was needed, he argued, was not so 
much money as the right economic conditions favourable to the growth of 
population.97   
 The election of Ramsay MacDonald’s second administration in May 1929 did 
not mean that the Labour government had abandoned the idea of working with the 
dominions to alleviate Britain’s unemployment problem.  However, a more 
commonsensical approach had now permeated the corridors of Whitehall.  Arthur 
Ponsonby, the parliamentary under-secretary of state for dominion affairs, was told by 
the lord privy seal, J. H. Thomas, that: ‘I look to Canada as being the most important 
of all our Dominions in connection with migration, but I cannot too strongly urge that 
no greater mistake will be made than anyone assuming or even giving colour to the 
view that migration to the Dominions is to be a solution of our unemployed 
problem’.98  Another keen observation was also made by Skevington when he tabled 
his final report to the dominions office in April 1929.  He pointed out that the 
possibilities of any substantial increase in Canada’s capacity to absorb immigrants 
depended upon the prospects of a more rapid expansion of the manufacturing 
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industries.  Nonetheless, for many British officials, Canada, of all the dominions, still 
had the most to offer British migrants and was the only one still willing to settle them 
on the land at a reasonable cost.   
 Eager to keep an open dialogue with Ottawa, Thomas announced in the British 
House of Commons that it was no good talking of self-government to the dominions, 
nor was it wise to acknowledge that they were ‘independent and free’, and then 
criticizing them because they did not do what you had dictated to them.  This was a 
profound mistake (which Baldwin’s government had seemingly ignored).  Take 
unemployment, he mused.  Nothing but harm would arise by ‘letting [the dominions] 
believe for a moment that you want or are assuming to solve your unemployment 
problem at their expense.  They resent it, and resent it bitterly’.  Echoing Amery’s 
message to Baldwin in 1928, Thomas argued that the same equality had to exist when 
mediating with the dominions over migration; an issue which had to be negotiated on 
the spot and in person.99  This did not stop critics such as George Lansbury, the first 
commissioner of works.  He complained to MacDonald that a bigger effort had to be 
made over migration and land settlement.  If a radical solution was not found and the 
government failed to help ‘develop the land lying idle in the Dominions, then the end 
of the British Empire [was] not very far off’.100  
 Unfortunately for Lansbury and others who were keen to resume large-scale 
migration to Canada, the timing was inauspicious.  When Thomas went to Canada in 
August 1929 to drum up support for empire settlement his entreaties fell on deaf ears. 
 So, too, did his attempts to persuade Ottawa that British migrants should be given 
preference over continental immigrants.  By now, even the railway companies had 
decided to abandon their immigration operations; and in January 1930 the federal 
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government began contemplating disaggregating itself from land settlement 
agreements previously negotiated between itself and the British government, shifting 
the financial burden and administrative responsibilities onto the provincial 
governments.  The Wall Street Crash of September 1929 and rising unemployment in 
Canada finally stopped any new state-assisted migration initiatives dead in their 
tracks.  By the end of 1930, the newly-elected Conservative government in Canada led 
by R. B. Bennett was forced to introduce tighter immigration controls.  Assisted 
passage and other betterment schemes were promptly abandoned.101   
 
V 
The problem with the British government’s attempts to promote increased migration, 
especially from the urban and industrial areas, was that the association between 
empire settlement and unemployment created prejudice overseas.  Similarly, it was 
recognized by British officials that the two questions could not be completely 
dissociated as those who travelled overseas relieved to some extent the domestic 
situation.  This connection had been recognized by the board of trade in 1921 when 
Amery was preparing the political ground for the Empire Settlement Act.  It was 
desirable to promote emigration ‘for Imperial purposes of an economic as well as of a 
political character’ and there was no getting around the fact the inter-relationship 
between state-aided empire migration and the problems of domestic unemployment.102 
On the eve of his trip to Canada in 1928, Lovat was similarly cautioned by his close 
friend Lord Lothian, a former acolyte of Milner and one closely versed in dominion 
affairs.  Lothian warned him that one of the ‘troubles’ about migration was that the 
dominions had always been ‘approached from the stand point that they ought to help 
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Great Britain’.  They were naturally on the defensive when asked, conveyed Lothian, 
therefore growing dominion resistance to migration schemes which promoted the 
needs of the ‘mother country’ first should not come as a surprise.103   
 The home secretary, Sir William Joynson-Hicks, made a similar point to 
Baldwin in the run up to the 1929 general election.  He found it most ‘disquieting’ 
that the fortunes of the Conservative party were linked to the question of 
unemployment and empire migration.  An attack on the government’s unemployment 
policy was inevitable; and it was therefore essential to use ‘our utmost endeavour to 
render such an attack abortive’.  The announcement of a migration agreement with the 
Canadians would be an invaluable weapon with which to blunt the government’s 
critics.  He lamented, however, that ‘any land settlement scheme would appear 
foredoomed to failure if there were any suggestion that it was linked up with the relief 
of unemployment’.104  By the end of the decade the British high commissioner in 
Ottawa reported to Amery that it was critical to try and keep Britain’s migration policy 
divorced as far as possible from the issue of unemployment.  He noted that when 
immigration from the United Kingdom was discussed in Canada it was invariably 
referred to in relation to Britain’s serious unemployment problem.  ‘I doubt if it is 
possible now to alter this impression’, he confided.  As a countermeasure, he 
suggested that it would be useful to emphasize domestic training schemes ‘as a 
guarantee that the ex-unemployed, who may come here as migrants, will not only 
know something about farm work but will also have been “tried out” and their 
adaptability to land work tested during their period of training’.105 
 Economic factors aside, the failure to establish a landed British yeomanry in 
Canada after 1918 was in part attributable to the growth of ‘sturdy’ dominion 
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nationalism.  E. T. Crutchley, Britain’s migration representative in Australia, reported 
in 1932 that the growth of dominion nationalism in the 1920s, itself strengthened by 
the equality of status conferred by the 1926 imperial conference and confirmed in the 
Statute of Westminster in 1931, revealed ‘a manifest determination to view questions 
of population and migration from the national point of view only’.106  No longer would 
the needs of Great Britain dictate migration policy unless it coincided with 
circumstances or conditions in the dominions that favoured a large incursion of British 
subjects.  As Egan forcefully reminded his prime minister in May 1929: ‘The policy of 
the Department [of Immigration and Colonization] is to secure the largest possible 
immigration of the classes Canada needs and can assimilate with profit to the 
newcomer and without loss to Canada.  Canada with her vast area, her natural 
resources and her sparse population needs immigration – not indiscriminate or 
haphazard immigration but a movement of people who will bear a direct relationship 
to the opportunity awaiting the newcomer’.107   
 As the economic uncertainties intensified, Ottawa remained adamant that the 
imposition of tighter entry regulations which restricted access to those immigrants 
who contributed immediately to industries which suffered from a shortage of 
experienced manpower was the correct approach.  Moreover, the strategy of ‘passing 
all immigrants through a fine sieve’ was also designed to allay the fears of Canadian 
labor that staunchly believed that British immigrants competed for jobs, lowered 
wages, and increased unemployment.  However, narrow-minded and uninformed this 
argument may have been in the minds of many British officials, the fear that British 
migrants competed with Canadians in a shrinking job market was nonetheless 
widespread.  How prescient therefore was Amery’s plea to Baldwin in 1928 that the 
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gulf which existed between Canada and the United Kingdom could be bridged only by 
employing a policy of compromise and indulgence.108   
 What did this mean for fortifying the bonds of Britishness in Canada?  Clearly, 
the findings indicate a variety of tensions and contradictions inherent in the quest for a 
‘Britannic’ identity in 1920s English Canada.  Despite the political rhetoric, especially 
in western Canada, for more British stock to reinforce Anglo-Canadian society from 
the so-called degenerative hordes from eastern and southern Europe, the stark 
economic reality was that the type and quality of the British migrant demanded by 
Canadian farmers, civic leaders and politicians was far from being of the ‘right type’.  
This was especially true of the assisted migrant, most of which were primarily from 
urban and industrial backgrounds, and preferred to live and work in Canada’s bustling 
cities and towns.  Essentially, their immediate contributions were to the tertiary, 
commercial and industrial sectors of the Canadian economy.  Indeed, for thriving 
metropoles like Toronto, Winnipeg and Vancouver, the British - or more accurately 
the English character of these cities - were certainly being reinforced by this new 
intake of neo-Britons from the ‘mother country’.  In that respect, Britishness was 
being reinforced, but it was primarily in urban not rural environments.   
 Compounding this problem was another unmistakable fact.  Continental 
immigration surpassed British intake after 1925-6 and maintained its numerical 
dominance throughout the rest of the decade.109  Yet, here is an interesting paradox.  
Aggressive marketing by the railway companies had much to do with the increasing 
number of arrivals from continental Europe, despite that fact that between 1922 and 
1935 over 107,000 people from the British Isles were given assistance to migrate to 
Canada.110  This was a far cry from the millions that dreamers like Amery had 
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envisioned.  Moreover, it was the European immigrants who made a much more 
significant contribution to the development of Canada’s primary resource sector in the 
1920s.  They were cheaper, more adaptable and possessed the requisite skills and 
backgrounds necessary for pioneering on the western prairies or working in the forests 
of northern Canada.  Above all, the vast majority were loyal citizens, who were eager 
to assimilate to a Canadian way of life and adopt the trappings of Britishness.111  In the 
end, arguments over racial purity, ethnicity and the need to augment Canada’s Anglo-
Saxon character failed to supplant the fundamental economic reality in 1920s Canada: 
 that it needed skilled migrants irrespective of racial background to develop its 
expanding hinterland.  The simple irony was that after the Great War the increasing 
majority of migrants involved in this national project were not British.  Paradoxically, 
British government funding of emigration throughout the empire in the 1920s owed 
more to post-war anxieties about the feared consequences of demobilisation and 
economic decline in Britain than to imperial sentiment or shoring up Anglo-Canadian 
cultural values.  Financial and political priorities subordinated the lofty cultural 
aspirations almost every time.    
 Finally, it was also recognized by London and Ottawa that migration could not 
be used simply as a bargaining tool in Anglo-Canadian relations or be solely directed 
to the complementary issues of how to increase dominion productivity, expand 
markets for dominion produce and safeguard markets for British manufacturing.  
Imperial migration was a joint venture that required active support and encouragement 
on both sides of the Atlantic.  Co-operation not confrontation was the new watchword. 
Conversely, the dominions could not have it all their own way.  British officials 
argued that in future assisted settlement schemes the dominions would have to be 
 
 
 
41 
prepared to contribute on an equal share financially.  More importantly, the onus was 
on the dominions to provide better settler support and aftercare.112  In the context of 
Anglo-Canadian relations, the renewal of the Empire Settlement Act in 1938 reflected 
these changes both in attitude and policy.  These transformations were significant for 
another key reason.  The compromises made in the spheres of assisted migration and 
empire settlement between these two nations demonstrated the reality of the new 
footing on which Anglo-dominion relations was being established.  It demonstrated 
what dominion-hood meant in practice; how dominion political autonomy, especially 
in the all-important exercises of nation-building and ethnic construction, could be 
exercised with due acknowledgement of the imperial connection.  Furthermore, it was 
in this continuing and complex interplay between ethnicity and economics that the 
British World was restocked and (re)defined. 
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